<h4>Chapter 118: deep-lying ymaker</h4>


    The electrifying atmosphere of Sun Magic Stadium ignited the spectators'' rationality as they passionately and joyfully enjoyed today''s Super Bowl.


    Aldrich held his drink while overlooking the field, surrounded by a group of yers. Some understood the rules of Rugby, while others didn''t, but that didn''t really matter; Rugby wasn''t a particrly difficult sport to understand.


    Especially with the clear distinction between offense and defense in the game, it was easy to see which team was attacking and which was defending.


    Just watching the game for five minutes would show that the team that was on offense after the kickoff was led by the core yer, the quarterback.


    Das Cowboys'' Aikman and Pittsburgh Steelers'' O''Donnell were two superstar quarterbacksmanding their teams'' offensive ys.


    When Aikmanpleted a precise long pass to advance his team''s yardage, Aldrich turned to Pirlo and smiled, "The demands on a quarterback are quite high. Passing is a fundamental skill; both long and short passes have to be incredibly precise. At the same time, they need to read the game''s dynamics in an instant and deliver the ball to a safe spot. Sometimes they take risks, but those risks can be significant. If they seed, it could directly help a teammate score a touchdown. If they fail and the opponent intercepts, it could lead to catastrophic consequences."


    Pirlo listened earnestly. With his football knowledge, he understood that Aldrich''s insights were also applicable to the football field.


    The quarterback isn''t the frontliner like a running back, but they are definitely the soul of the team—a strategic genius calling the shots from behind the scenes.


    However, Pirlo knew that in contemporary football, it was still the era of the ymaker. So he asked, "Is the quarterback the number 10 yer in football?"


    Aldrich shook his head and replied, "The number 10 yer is the team''s core, someone who can pass, dribble, and shoot, which requires a very high skill set. Andrea, I want to discuss the tactical trends in football with you and your teammates; this is crucial for your future development. Because when you reach your peak in your professional career, you will be in the middle of evolving tactical trends in football. Of course, I can''t predict with certainty what transformations will ur in football tactics over the next ten or twenty years, but some changes are surely on the horizon."


    The yers'' expressions grew more serious; discussing tactics with their coach wasn''t a job requirement, but it would definitely aid their growth and help them understand Aldrich''s game ns for their roles on the field.


    Aldrich pondered thoughtfully, "Let''s revisit the evolution of tactical formations in football — 1-2-3-5, WM, 4-2-4, 4-4-2, 3-4-3, 4-3-3, 4-5-1, and so on. One clear trend is the increasing rationality in formation structure, with a decrease in the number of forwards and an increase in midfield yers. Why is that? Beyond the influence of rules, the most important factor is tactical innovation. In the 1930s, Arsenal employed the WM formation, in the 1960s, Italy introduced chained defense, and in the 1970s, the Nethends showcased total football. Today, it''s almost impossible to witness a tactical revolution because the world is entering a synchronized era, meaning the most popr tactics will be studied and imitated, making it hard for anyone to innovate. However, certain countries out of sync with the world may dazzle us with their tactics, like North Korea deploying a bizarre 3-3-1 formation. But thinking from another angle, their refusal to synchronize with the world allows for such unconventional innovations, albeit they often fail."


    The yers were spellbound by Aldrich''s speech, captivated as athletes who naturally enjoyed hearing oundish yet sensible perspectives.


    "4-4-2 is often regarded as a formation pioneered by Ennd and remains in use today. However, back in the day, Maslov from Dynamo Kyiv had already shifted to a 4-4-2 formation, facing fierce criticism at the time. His 4-4-2 was simr to Ennd''s that won the World Cup, but they weren''t directly linked. Maslov defended himself by stating: ''Football is like an airne; as speed increases, air resistance increases, so you must make the nose more aerodynamic.'' This statement might seem meaningless at first, but I believe it''s suggesting that as yers get faster, finding space bes more challenging. Therefore, attacking yers must hide more effectively to avoid being defended against."


    Aldrich''s words resonated with the yers, causing many to nod in agreement.


    Even top forwards can find themselves tightly marked at times and have games where they shine little. Thus, in attack, two critical aspects must be addressed: identify defensive weaknesses and conceal the attack points.


    Pirlo seemed to have an epiphany and said, "Withdrawn forwards."


    Aldrich snapped his fingers and nodded, "Yes, withdrawn forwards or the diversification of forward roles. When a forward possesses organizational skills, their withdrawal can disrupt the opponents'' marking n, making our attack more fluid and dynamic. This resembles the ''half-nine'' yers we refer to today. However, yers in this position require exceptionally high technical skills. It might take five years before the football world sees a top yer in that position. Currently, the best yer there is Baggio; he can organize and often assists while also scoring. But not every yer who wants to y that position can reach his level; that''s a limitation of ability. Many attacking midfielders can provide assists, and many forwards can score, but achieving a bnce that elevates the team is extremely difficult."


    As he spoke, Aldrich cast a meaningful nce at Nedved.


    yers in that role must be able to pass, dribble, and shoot, and Nedved fits those characteristics. Aldrich hoped he could be that kind of yer.


    Pirlo, however, looked a bit gloomy; he understood his own strengths—dribbling and breaking through were not his strong suits.


    "Do you remember our two matches against Manchester United this season?" Aldrich asked, taking a sip of his drink.


    The yers nodded, vividly recalling the matches.


    Aldrich chuckled, "At a certain level, the shes between offense and defense be brutal. We tightly marked their forwards, and they did the same to our forwards, leaving no room for our attacking yers to operate. So who were the yers that changed the game? It was the ones who dribbled and suddenly burst into the penalty area, or the fullbacks who unexpectedly joined the attack to disrupt the opponents'' defensive rhythm, as well as the forwards who dropped back and struck unexpectedly. It''s not about methodicallypleting attacks on textbook positions with equal numbers. We''ve performed well and scored a lot, but do you understand the context in which our goals were scored?"


    Back blurted out, "Quick transitions after defending."


    The other teammates nodded in agreement. The tactical principles drilled into them during training executed wlessly on the field, which also led their young team to excellent results.


    Aldrich nodded, "Exactly. The tactical trend in football is founded on defense. Waiting for the opponent to set their defensive shape before we attack is challenging. Simrly, setting up our defense and waiting for the opponent to attack can create substantial resistance. Therefore, our attacks are often based on the opponent''s failed offensive move—when they haven''t yet set up their defensive shape after an attack. At that moment, the opponent is likely to have many vulnerabilities. We advance quickly with one touch, and the yers spread out to find gaps. Leveraging speed before the opponentpletes their defense is crucial for us."


    The yers were enraptured, and many of them finallyprehended part of the essence of their current football style through Aldrich''s borate exnation.


    Football is inherently a back-and-forthpetition, unlike Rugby where one side attacks and then switches the offensive team out while the defensive team takes its ce. The fluidity of a football match makes it difficult to define clear phases by the minute or second. As the pace quickens and yer characteristics be increasingly multifaceted, quick counter-attacks are fundamental for top teams. Teams that cannot counter orck counter-attack speed find it hard to im the title.


    "If you''ve ever watched Guardi y, you might agree with me: it seems Barcelona is missing a person. Yes, he seems rather inconspicuous, diligently doing the dirty work in the back, and when he gets the ball, he dutifully passes it to a teammate. Only in some carefully edited highlight reels can you see his ability to deliver threatening passes or make decisive contributions during counter-attacks. But over 90 minutes of y in 42 rounds of La Liga, his standout moments are few. There''s a saying I hope you won''t pass on too widely, lest the media misunderstand and stir up controversy: I believe Guardi is the disciple that Cruyff could not sessfully nurture."


    In this era, even though Guardi holds the title of a football icon, he didn''t stand out much in terms of aplishments and influencepared to contemporaneous midfielders.


    The yers gazed at Aldrich in confusion, awaiting further exnation.


    "I don''t know if Cruyff''s concept of creating a number four yer is simr to that of a quarterback in Rugby, but at the very least, Guardi''s role didn''t entirely replicate that of a Rugby quarterback. He was a key yer in defense and also the main organizer in the attacking backline; both responsibilities rested heavily on him. Achieving what he has today ismendable, but as football matches speed up and physicality intensifies, no yer can excel at both ends. Simply put, yers will be more all-rounded, but in matches, their energy must have a focus. If primary energy is spent on defense, offense will inevitably be sacrificed, and vice versa. Since football is a team sport, I believe the tasks of defense and organizing attacks can be separated, allowing two yers in midfield to maximize their strengths."


    Aldrich has always believed that it was precisely because Guardi wasn''t particrly sessful as a yer—at least, he wouldn''t be considered a world-ss yer—that he was able to refine and elevate Cruyff''s tactical theories when he became a coach. He resolved the contradictions he faced during his ying days. His Dream Team featured Busquets focusing on defense, Xavi emphasizing organization, and Iniesta excelling in offensive support, creating a Barcelona with a terrifying bnce and control between attack and defense.


    And this tactic isrgely employed by many strong teams, separating defensive tasks from organizational elements, capitalizing on each other''s strengths, and maximizing advantages while enabling more skilled teammates to cover weaknesses. The pinnacle of team football doesn''t have to be seamless; rather, it''s about how teammates mutually augment each other, producing an effect greater than the sum of its parts.


    Pirlo''s eyes brightened as he asked, "Boss, why are organizational tasks situated in the back and midfield?"


    Aldrichughed, "Didn''t I mention it earlier? With yers getting faster, attacking points must be concealed deeper. In matches between top teams, the closer you get to the opponent''s penalty area, the less space there is for organization. Having more forwards up top just leads to them being tightly marked. Late runs from attacking yers will be the mainstream form of attack, pushing the organizing area further back. A wave of lethal attack can even spring from the goalkeeper or defenders. Thus, transitioning in midfield and choosing forward attacking points be crucial in determining the oue."


    At this moment, Pirlo experienced an epiphany. He began to understand how Aldrich and Nagy''s training requirements could manifest practically during matches.


    But whether this approach would seed, he wasn''t sure. However, it was surely worth trying.